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Summary 
The debate about the relative merits of presidentialism and 
parliamentarism has a long history, but it was revived in 1990 with 
Juan Linz’s articles about the supposed perils of presidentialism and 
the virtues of parliamentarism. The argument presented in this 
review is that we are now witnessing a ‘third wave’ of 
presidential/parliamentary studies since 1990. The ‘first wave’ began 
with Linz’s articles. It was characterised by a debate in which there 
was one explanatory variable (the regime type) and one dependent 
variable (the success of democratic consolidation). The ‘second wave’ 
of presidential/parliamentary studies began around 1992-93. In the 
‘second wave’ there is more than one explanatory variable (the 
regime type, usually, plus the party system and/or leadership 
powers) and often a different dependent variable (‘good governance’ 
as opposed to democratic consolidation). The ‘third wave’ is quite 
different. This work is informed by more general theories of political 
science. Here, the respective merits of presidential and parliamentary 
regimes are not necessarily the sole focus of the work. However, its 
overarching approach informs the debate in this area in a more or 
less direct manner. The argument in this review article is that the 
‘third wave’ of studies has much to offer the ongoing debate about 
the relative merits of presidentialism and parliamentarism. 
 
The debate about the relative merits of presidentialism and parliamentarism has 
continued for more than a century. So, for example, writing in the latter part of 
the 19th century, Walter Bagehot and Woodrow Wilson both argued in favour of 
parliamentarism. 1 During the Second World War there was heated debate in the 
US, during which Don Price defended presidentialism and Harold Laski acted as 
an external moderator arguing, in a typically passionate manner, that neither 
system was intrinsically better than the other.2 In many respects, the points made 
in these debates, and many others like them, are still present in much of the work 
on this topic today. For example, Bruce Ackerman has recently written a review 
essay in which he argues in favour of parliamentarism in ways that would be 
entirely familiar to the great writers of the past.3 In short, there is no doubt that 
the debate about presidentialism and parliamentarism has a long and 
distinguished history and that it is associated with some of the most respected 
and well-known intellectuals and political actors of the age. 
 That said, this review focuses on the study of presidentialism and 
parliamentarism only since 1990. While good work was conducted in the years 
immediately prior to this date,4 this starting point is, hopefully, uncontroversial. 
It marked a new era of democratic government, most notably in Central and 
Eastern Europe and the former USSR, whereby many countries had to make 
difficult constitutional choices about which form of government to adopt. 
Moreover, it also marked the publication of Juan Linz’s seminal articles in Journal 
of Democracy in which he outlined the supposed perils of presidentialism and 
defended the apparent virtues of parliamentarism.5 These articles sparked an 
immediate reaction6 as well as a debate that is still ongoing. 
The argument presented in this review is that we are now witnessing a 
‘third wave’ of presidential/parliamentary studies since 1990. The ‘first wave’ 
began with Linz’s articles. It was characterised by a debate in which there was 
one explanatory variable (the regime type) and one dependent variable (the 
success of democratic consolidation). The work associated with the ‘first wave’ 
lasted through to the mid-1990s and even beyond. However, for the most part it 
was confined to the very early years of the period in question. The ‘second wave’ 
of presidential/parliamentary studies began around 1992-93. It is associated with 
the highly influential work of scholars such as Matthew Shugart and John Carey 
and Scott Mainwaring and it continues to this day. 7 The two defining features of 
the ‘second wave’ are that there is more than one explanatory variable (the 
regime type, usually, plus the party system and/or leadership powers) and often 
a different dependent variable (‘good governance’ as opposed to democratic 
consolidation). The ‘third wave’ of presidential/parliamentary studies is quite 
different. This work is informed by more general theories of political science. 
Here, the respective merits of presidential and parliamentary regimes are not 
necessarily the sole focus of the work. However, its overarching approach 
informs the debate in this area in a more or less direct manner. In one respect, the 
‘third wave’ begins in 1995 with George Tsebelis’s first article about veto players 
and regimes types.8 However, we see the full expression of this work somewhat 
later, most notably with George Tsebelis’s book on veto players and Kaare 
Strøm’s work on the chain of delegation in parliamentary democracies.9 
The rest of this paper examines each of the three ‘waves’ of 
presidential/parliamentary studies in turn. It should be stressed that the terms 
‘first wave’ etc. are not used here to define discrete periods of study. While they 
are associated with a certain temporal sequence, they are mainly used as an 
organising device and work associated with the ‘second’ wave existing alongside 
‘third’ wave work in recent years. It should also be stressed that this review 
article stays strictly within the ‘institutionalist’ canon of academic literature, or, 
more specifically, what Guy Peters might call the field of ‘empirical 
institutionalism’.10 In so doing, this paper does not engage with the debate about 
whether culture, society, or the economy provide better explanations of political 
behaviour than institutional variables. They may do, but the article is based on 
the simple assumption that institutions matter and examines the ways in which 
different writers have argued that they matter. In addition, it should also be 
stressed that the article does not address the ‘upstream’ issue of institutional 
choice, or why countries chose presidentialism, parliamentarism, or some other 
type of regime altogether. Instead, the focus is on the ‘downstream’ issue of the 
consequences of institutional choice. 
 
1. The ‘first wave’ of presidential/parliamentary studies: Linz’s seminal 
articles 
 
The ‘first wave’ of presidential/parliamentary studies began with Linz’s work in 
Journal of Democracy.11 This was followed up in other publications, most notably 
his magisterial chapter in the volume edited by Linz himself and Arturo 
Valenzuela.12 The theme of that work was that parliamentarism was more likely 
to lead to the successful consolidation of democracy than presidentialism. In this 
view, Linz was supported by such eminent figures as Alfred Stepan.13 By 
contrast, Power and Gasiorowski argued that the empirical evidence did not 
suggest that presidentialism was associated with a lesser likelihood of 
democratic survival than parliamentarism.14 Other writers widened the terms of 
the debate by identifying semi-presidential regimes and examining their impact 
on democratic consolidation.15 Even though there is a variety of work in the ‘first 
wave’ of presidential/parliamentary studies, the common element to it is the 
focus on one explanatory variable (regime type) and one dependent variable 
(successful democratic consolidation). Moreover, while there were dissenting 
voices during the ‘first wave’ of studies, there was a basic consensus that 
parliamentarism was more likely to lead to the consolidation of democracy than 
presidentialism. 
 The work of Juan Linz is emblematic of the ‘first wave’. For example, in 
his first main paper on the subject, Linz makes the focus of his study very clear. 
Like others, he is interested in “the relative merits of different types of 
democratic regimes”.16 While Linz does make passing reference to what he calls 
“hybrid”17 regimes in Finland and France, he also makes it apparent that his 
main preoccupation is with parliamentary and presidential regimes and he 
provides definitions of each type of regime. As we shall see, in both this paper 
and subsequently, Linz notes that there are different varieties of parliamentarism 
and presidentialism.18 Even so, he argues that there are “fundamental 
differences” between the two systems and asserts that all “presidential and 
parliamentary systems have a common core that allows their differentiation and 
some systematic comparisons”.19 Specifically, he states that a presidential regime 
has two particular features: the legislature and the executive are both directly 
elected and both are elected for a fixed term.20 For Linz, “[m]ost of the 
characteristics and problems of presidential systems flow from these two 
essential features”.21 In other words, the perils of presidential and the virtues of 
parliamentarism are intrinsic to the institutional features of the respective 
systems. This is the sense in which, for Linz, there is, in effect, just one 
explanatory variable: regime type. 
 In a review essay, Mainwaring and Shugart argued that across all of his 
work Linz identified five general problems of presidentialism: the executive and 
legislature have competing claims to legitimacy; the fixed terms of office make 
presidential regimes more rigid than parliamentary systems; presidentialism 
encourages a winner-takes-all outcome; the style of presidential politics 
encourages presidents to be intolerant of political opposition; and 
presidentialism encourages populist candidates.22 Whether or not he always 
emphasised all of these issues, Linz makes it clear what he believes the general 
effect of them to be. He states: “A careful comparison of presidentialism as such 
with parliamentarism as such leads to the conclusion that, on balance, the former 
is more conducive to stable democracy than the latter”.23 Moreover, this 
argument is made repeatedly and consistently. So, for example, in the well-
known longer version of his classic article Linz concludes by saying that 
“presidentialism seems to involve greater risk for stable democratic politics than 
contemporary parliamentarism”.24 All told, whatever the merits of the argument, 
it is always clear what is at stake. This is the sense in which there is just one 
dependent variable in Linz’s work, namely the stability of the democratic order. 
 The work associated with the first wave of presidential/parliamentary 
studies was remarkably coherent. The aim was to assess the effect of different 
institutional arrangements on the prospects for democratic consolidation. The 
conclusion was that presidentialism was less conducive to democratic stability 
than parliamentarism. This line of argument was adopted not just by Linz, but by 
other writers. For example, Fred Riggs argued that the “frequent collapse of 
presidentialist regimes in about 30 Third World countries that have attempted to 
establish constitutions based on the principle of ‘separation of powers’ suggests 
that this political formula is seriously flawed”.25 A similar argument was made 
by Stepan and Skach. They argued that presidential and parliamentary systems 
have “analytically separable propensities”.26 For them, the “essence of pure 
presidentialism is mutual independence”,27 which “creates the possibility of an 
impasse between the chief executive and the legislative body for which there is 
no constitutionally available impasse-breaking device”.28 As a result, they argue 
that pure parliamentarism seems “to present a more supportive evolutionary 
framework for consolidating democracy than pure presidentialism.29 The overlap 
with Linz’s analysis is evident. 
 Even though there was a large degree of consensus about the perils of 
presidentialism in the first wave of presidential/parliamentary studies, this 
conclusion was not shared by everyone. For example, Power and Gasiorowski 
conducted an empirical test of the Linz’s thesis and concluded that “the choice of 
constitutional type (presidential or parliamentary) is not significantly related to 
the likelihood of democratic survival in less developed countries”.30 Others 
writers took a different tack altogether and widened the terms of the debate. 
Most notably, Giovanni Sartori argued against both presidentialism and 
parliamentarism, seeming to prefer instead a semi-presidential form of 
government.31 Given that I have focused on semi-presidentialism elsewhere, I 
will not dwell upon it here.32 Suffice it to say that, for Linz and most other 
writers at that time, semi-presidentialism was either an ill-defined or largely 
untried concept. Certainly, it was not one that many people recommended. 
Linz’s view of semi-presidentialism was typical of academic thinking more 
generally when he stated: “In view of some of the experiences with this type of 
system it seems dubious to argue that in and by itself it can generate democratic 
stability”.33 
 In fact, perhaps the most telling critique of the first wave of 
presidential/parliamentary studies was written by Donald Horowitz very early 
on in the debate. Horowitz’s paper was a direct response to Linz’s article on the 
perils of presidentialism. Indeed, Linz’s paper on the virtues of parliamentarism 
was published in the same edition of Journal of Democracy as Horowitz’s article 
and the one was a direct rebuttal of the other. Specifically, Horowitz claimed that 
Linz based his empirical observations on a “highly selective sample of 
comparative experience, principally from Latin America”; that Linz assumed a 
particular system of electing the president, which is not necessarily the best 
system; and that separately elected presidents can perform useful functions for 
divided societies.34 In the context of this paper, the significance of Horowitz’s 
argument is that he emphasised the importance of factors other than those 
associated with ‘pure’ regime types. In particular, he argued that Linz ignored 
the impact of electoral systems. Horowitz stated that when parliamentary 
regimes use plurality systems, then they too encourage winner-take-all politics. 
Overall, he argued that Linz’s thesis “boils down to an argument not against the 
presidency, but against plurality election, not in favour of parliamentary systems 
but in favor of parliamentary coalitions”.35 
Horowitz’s argument is significant for two reasons. Firstly, it caused Linz 
to qualify his original argument. So, in his Virtues of Parliamentarism paper Linz 
stated: “I must stress that I did not argue that any parliamentary system is ipso 
facto more likely to ensure democratic stability than any presidential system”.36 
This is true. He only argued that parliamentary systems were more conducive to 
democratic stability than presidential systems. Even so, the emphatic tone of 
Linz’s original paper, and his subsequent work, was such that Horowitz can be 
forgiven for suggesting that Linz’s support for parliamentarism was largely 
unconditional. Secondly, Horowitz’s paper is also significant because it presaged 
the ‘second wave’ of presidential/parliamentary studies. In one sense, this 
‘second-wave’ work ‘fleshed out’ Horowitz’s initial thinking in a rigorous and 
systematic manner. In so doing, its main contribution was that it emphasised the 
need to focus on more than one explanatory variable. 
 
2. The ‘second wave’ of presidential/parliamentary studies: executive 
powers, party systems and good governance 
 
The ‘second wave’ of presidential/parliamentary studies begins with the work of 
Matthew Shugart and John Carey and Scott Mainwaring.37 The main theme of 
this work is that the early debate about presidentialism and parliamentarism was 
misguided because it focused only on the supposedly ‘pure’ characteristics of 
each regime type. Instead, the fundamental institutional features of regime types 
needed to be analysed in conjunction with other institutional variables: the 
powers of the executive, the party system, and/or the electoral system. In other 
words, the defining feature of this work is that there is more than one 
explanatory variable. As a result, what is common to the ‘second wave’ of 
presidential/parliamentary studies is that writers usually emphasise the variety 
of institutional practice that occurs within presidential and parliamentary 
regimes. Many of them were also more favourable to ‘properly constructed’ 
presidential regimes than writers such as Linz. A second feature of the ‘second 
wave’ of presidential/parliamentary studies is that writers have increasingly 
focused not only on the link between institutional design and democratic 
consolidation but also on more general issues of good governance. As a result, 
the ‘second wave’ is now usually associated with a different dependent variable 
than the ‘first wave’. 
 The first element of the ‘second wave’ of presidential/parliamentary 
studies is the emphasis placed on a wider set of institutional variables than just 
the supposedly ‘essential’ features of presidential and parliamentary regimes. In 
this regard, Scott Mainwaring’s work is exemplary. Writing around the same 
time as Linz’s seminal article, Mainwaring stressed that “the combination of 
presidentialism and a fractionalized multi-party system seems especially inimical 
to democracy”.38 However, a much more clearly articulated and rigorous 
expression of this argument was published three years later. In this latter article, 
Mainwaring demonstrates that in the period 1967-92 very few stable democracies 
had presidential systems.39 Thus, he agrees with the general argument that 
presidentialism is less likely to promote stable democracy than 
parliamentarism.40 However, having done so, he then re-examines the set of 
stable democracies and concludes that there is a correlation between stable 
presidential democracies and two-party systems. This finding leads him to his 
oft-cited conclusion that “multipartism and presidentialism make a difficult 
combination”.41 The reason why, he argues, is that in presidentialism systems 
multipartism increases the likelihood of both executive/legislative deadlock and 
ideological polarisation and that it also makes interparty coalition building more 
difficult.42 Overall, while Mainwaring acknowledges that social, cultural and 
economic conditions “also affect prospects for democracy”,43 his main 
contribution is the argument that “the combination of presidentialism and 
multipartism makes stable democracy difficult to sustain”.44 
Around the same time, a similar type of argument was made by Shugart 
and Carey. They begin their book by acknowledging the basic difference between 
presidential and parliamentary systems, namely that in the latter there are “two 
agents of the electorate: an assembly and a president”.45 However, having done 
so, they immediately sum up their most important contribution to the debate 
when they say that “there are myriad ways to design constitutions that vary the 
relationship of the voters’ two agents to one another, as well as to the 
electorate”.46 In subsequent chapters, they illustrate this point by ‘measuring’ the 
powers of popularly elected presidents. They do so by looking at the legislative 
powers of presidents (for example, whether they can veto bills passed by the 
legislature) and their non-legislative powers (for example, whether or not they 
select cabinet members). What they find is “reason to believe that the more 
powerful presidencies are also the more problematic”.47 Specifically, they argue 
that “regimes with great presidential legislative powers are problematic, as are 
those in which authority over cabinets is shared between assembly and 
president”.48 Whatever the specificities of the argument, the key point is that, like 
Mainwaring, Shugart and Carey focus on a combination of institutional 
variables. This emphasis clearly differentiates their work from the ‘first wave’. 
The focus on more than one explanatory variable leads writers like 
Mainwaring, and Shugart and Carey to underline the false dichotomy on which 
the perceive the work of people like Linz to be founded. For example, Shugart 
and Carey wrote: “the preponderance of recent academic writing on 
constitutional forms has stressed the superiority of parliamentarism over 
presidentialism, considering only a dichotomous classification of regimes, as 
unfortunately has been the case in most previous discussions”.49 To redress the 
balance, Shugart and Carey distinguished between a number of different 
systems: presidential; parliamentary; premier-presidential (similar to semi-
presidential regimes); president-parliamentary; assembly-independent regimes; 
and regimes where there is a directly elected prime minister.50 The difference 
between these institutional types was a function of whether or not the executive 
and legislative were independent of each other and the degree of power the 
president had over the cabinet. 
In their collaborative work Mainwaring and Shugart make a similar but 
nonetheless slightly different point. Here, one of their main aims is to show that 
even within the set of presidential systems, there is still a tremendous variety of 
political practice. In their review of Linz’s work, they make this point explicitly: 
“Linz’s critique is based mostly on a generic category of presidential systems. He 
does not sufficiently differentiate among kinds of presidentialism ... 
Presidentialism encompasses a range of systems of government, and variations 
within presidentialism are important”.51 Specifically, in their conclusion to an 
empirical study of presidentialism in Latin America, they argue that presidential 
systems “vary so greatly in the powers accorded to the president, the types of 
party and electoral systems with which they are associated, and the 
socioeconomic and historical context in which they were created that these 
differences are likely to be as important as the oft-assumed dichotomy between 
presidential and parliamentary system”.52 The key point is that they argue that 
Linz, and others, were wrong to generalise about the consequences of 
presidentialism. In fact, they assert, these consequences vary from one 
presidential regime to another as a function of other variables. 
This argument is now standard. In contrast to the early work on the 
subject, most writers now stress the variety of practice within both presidential 
and parliamentary systems and, hence, the potential similarities between the two 
types of system. For instance, in their recent review of the literature, Cheibub and 
Limongi identify three supposed differences between presidential and 
parliamentary systems: there is a majoritarian imperative in parliamentary 
systems; such systems are meant to foster cooperation; and they have a more 
centralised decision-making process, especially as regards the relationship 
between the executive and the legislature.53 However, they then identify the 
ways in which parliamentary and presidential systems operate and conclude the 
following: “Parliamentary systems do not operate under a ‘majoritarian 
imperative’; deadlock is not as frequent as supposed under presidentialism and 
is not absent from parliamentarism; coalition governments are not foreign to 
presidential systems and emerge for the same reasons as they do in 
parliamentary systems; decision making is not always centralized under 
parliamentarism and is not always decentralized under presidentialism”.54 As a 
result, they argue that the “reality of both parliamentary and presidential 
regimes is more complex than it would be if we derived these systems’ entire 
behavior from their first principles”.55 Again, the difference between this work 
and the initial work of writers such as Linz is stark. 
Another writer who might be associated with the ‘second wave’ of 
presidential/parliamentary studies is Arend Lijphart. Over the years, Lijphart 
has been concerned with arguing that consensual democracies are better than 
majoritarian democracies.56 Part of this project has included the argument that 
parliamentarism is generally better than presidentialism. Indeed, the tone of his 
chapter in the Linz and Valenzuela edited volume is reminiscent of the ‘first 
wave’ of presidential/parliamentary studies in this regard.57 However, the vast 
majority of Lijphart’s work has been concerned with the impact of multiple 
institutional variables. In this sense, his work resembles more closely the work of 
‘second wave’ studies. So, for example, soon after the aforementioned chapter he 
argued that the combination of parliamentarism and a proportional electoral 
system was best.58 Very recently, he has reiterated his support for 
parliamentarism, but only in the context of nine other institutional variables that 
also need to be considered when divided societies are designing their 
constitutional structures.59 Again, this is consistent with the basic elements of 
‘second wave’ studies. 
In his most recent article, Lijphart asserts that there is still a consensus that 
parliamentarism is better than presidentialism.60 All the same, the emphasis on 
more than one institutional explanatory variable and the observation that there is 
a variety of political practice within the set of presidential regimes led a number 
of ‘second wave’ writers to reassess the supposed perils of presidentialism. 
Consistent with Lijphart’s above assertion, these writers have not tended to 
argue that presidentialism is inherently better than parliamentarism. Indeed, the 
perils of presidentialism are often explicitly acknowledged.61 Instead, they have 
argued that presidentialism can operate effectively if it is combined with other 
institutional features. For example, Shugart and Carey were explicit in this 
regard. They argued that “presidentialism or premier-presidentialism properly 
crafted can exhibit conflict-dampening advantages ...”.62 Similarly, Mainwaring 
and Shugart concluded their critique of Linz’s work by saying:  “Presidential 
systems can be designed to function more effectively than they usually have. We 
have argued that providing the president with limited legislative power, 
encouraging the formation of parties that are reasonably disciplined in the 
legislature, and preventing extreme fragmentation of the party system enhance 
the viability of presidentialism”.63 So, while Lijphart may be correct in his overall 
assessment of the situation, the tone of much of the work associated with the and 
‘second wave’ of studies is quite different from the work of people like Linz in 
this respect. 
So far, the difference under discussion between the ‘first’ and ‘second 
waves’ has been solely that of the choice of explanatory variable, the former 
emphasising just one such variable and the latter focussing on a combination of 
institutional variables. Another difference lies in the choice of dependent 
variable(s). Many of the earlier writers in this debate focused solely on 
democratic consolidation. Indeed, this point also applies to many of the works of 
‘second wave’ presidential/parliamentary studies, including Mainwaring, 
Shugart and Carey, Mainwaring and Shugart, and Lijphart. Even so, right from 
the beginning of the ‘second wave’ of studies, people also considered issues 
relating to good governance more generally. Moreover, in so doing, good 
governance was not treated simply as a proxy for democratic consolidation. In 
other words, they opted for a different type of dependent variable. In fact, this is 
now the standard focus of ‘second wave’ presidential/parliamentary studies. 
The shift in the focus from democratic consolidation to ‘good governance’ 
is first found systematically in the edited volume by Weaver and Rockman. They 
argue that the “distinction between parliamentary systems and the U.S. system 
of checks and balances ... captures only a small part of potential institutional 
influences on governmental capacity”.64 In addition, they wish to focus on other 
institutional variables as well, including electoral norms and issues such as 
federalism, bicameralism, and judicial review. In this way, Weaver and Rockman 
are clearly part of the ‘second wave’ of studies in that they wish to focus on a 
combination of institutional factors as explanatory variables. At the same time, 
though, their main concern is not with the impact of such variables on 
democratic consolidation. Instead, in the introduction to the volume, they make 
it clear that they are interested in “governmental effectiveness”65 and “policy 
making capabilities” more generally.66 By ‘governmental effectiveness’ they 
mean the “specific capabilities”67 of governments and they identify ten such 
capabilities, including the ability to set and maintain priorities, to coordinate 
conflicting objectives, to make and ensure international commitments and so on. 
One of these capabilities is the capacity to manage political cleavages “to ensure 
that society does not degenerate into civil war”.68 In this way, their work may be 
related to the issue of democratic consolidation, but only indirectly so. Overall, 
their dependent variable is much broader and very different from the one 
identified in the work considered so far.  
In fact, as Kent Eaton notes in a recent review article, this sort of 
dependent variable has now become the norm.69 So, for example, Matthew 
Shugart, who was one of the leading figures at the beginning of the ‘second 
wave’ of studies, has now adopted this approach. He notes that recently “there 
has come to be considerable speculation among political scientists as to the 
advantages and disadvantages of presidential or parliamentary democracy from 
a policy-making standpoint”.70 His contribution to this literature is to argue that 
in a large country and/or a country where there is a large inequality of 
development and/or wealth, then a certain type of presidential system may be 
advantageous. In particular, a presidential system where the presidency has 
strong reactive and sometimes proactive powers may mean that the 
“particularistic tendencies of a fragmented legislature can be partially 
counteracted”.71 In so doing, Shugart argues, such a system may allow the more 
effective provision of national collective goods, including “lower fiscal deficits; 
deregulation of industry; free; trade; growth with equity; universal education 
and health provision; and other policies that broad swaths of the population 
rather than specifically targeted narrow constituencies”.72 The contrast between 
these elements of ‘good governance’ and Shugart’s previous emphasis on 
democratic consolidation as the dependent variable is clear. 
Another recent study is even more explicit in this regard. In the 
introduction to their recent edited volume, Stephan Haggard and Mathew 
McCubbins rehearse the by now familiar criticism of ‘first wave’ studies. They 
state: “Although the relative merits and consequences of presidential and 
parliamentary systems have received substantial attention, we argue that this 
distinction between macro institutions is inadequate; explaining political 
outcomes requires greater focus on the details of institutional structure”.73 
Accordingly, they identify four key institutional explanatory variables: the 
powers of the president; legislative institutions (bicameralism etc.); federalism; 
and electoral rules.74 By the same token, they identify a number of dependent 
variables, none of which is related to democratic consolidation. They are: 
budgeting, privatisation and electricity regulation.75 Having established the 
research design, in a subsequent chapter of the book Shugart and Haggard draw 
the, by now, equally familiar conclusion that presidentialism is not necessarily 
perilous. They state: “we have conceded that certain forms of presidentialism 
appear to have some of the weaknesses its critics have noted”,76 but they also 
argue: “presidential systems that provide for strong legislative backing provide 
the basis, at least in theory, for decisive, credible, and programmatic policy”.77 
Overall, this volume and particularly the chapters authored by a mix of Haggard, 
McCubbins and Shugart might be taken as the existing state of the art of the 
‘second wave’. 
 
3. The ‘third wave’ of presidential/parliamentary studies: veto players and 
principal-agent analysis 
 
In many respects, work consistent with this ‘second wave’ is still ongoing. That 
said, it is possible to identify a ‘third wave’ of presidential/parliamentary 
studies. This can be traced back to the mid-1990s with George Tsebelis’s first 
article about veto players and regimes types,78 but fuller expressions of this work 
have only begun to appear somewhat more recently.79 With ‘second’ and ‘third’ 
wave studies currently appearing simultaneously, it is important to distinguish 
between them. In essence, we can say that the ‘second’ (and ‘first’) wave of 
studies is (are) characterised by a discrete focus of inquiry using a more or less 
rigorous methodology, while the ‘third’ wave is marked by a discrete and 
rigorous methodology that is applied to a more or less focused set of inquiries. In 
other words, the focus in the ‘second’ wave of studies is presidentialism and 
parliamentarism. When examining this topic, writers have adopted a range of 
quantitative and qualitative methodologies. By contrast, work in the ‘third’ wave 
is founded on a very explicit methodological approach, whether it is veto 
players, principal-agent theory, rational choice institutionalism and/or the new 
institutional economics generally. On the basis of such an approach, writers have 
addressed many issues, one of which is the debate about presidentialism and 
parliamentarism. 
The veto players approach was developed by George Tsebelis and is 
outlined most fully in his recent book.80 This approach is an overarching theory 
of how political institutions operate. So, Tsebelis defines veto players as 
“individual or collective actors whose agreement is necessary for a change of the 
status quo”.81 There are institutional veto players, meaning ones generated by the 
constitution of a country, and partisan veto players, meaning ones produced by 
the political game, such as parliamentary majorities. Tsebelis argues that each 
country has “a configuration of veto players”.82 This configuration affects the 
outcomes of policy, generating a greater or lesser degree of policy stability. The 
degree of stability depends on the number of veto players, the ideological 
distance between them and the extent to which they are internally cohesive. On 
the basis of this logic, Tsebelis has applied the veto players approach to various 
aspects of political life, including the study of the European Union and the 
structure of budgets.83 Moreover, other writers have been quick to adopt the 
approach and have applied it to an even wider range of topics, such as German 
economic policy.84 
 In this context, one of the areas on which Tsebelis has focused is the 
debate about presidentialism and parliamentarism. In this work, he has explicitly 
criticised Linz’s method.85 Specifically, he repeats Horowitz’s point that Linz’s 
argument about the perils of presidentialism is derived from a limited number 
of, mainly, Latin American cases. Instead, one of the key points that Tsebelis 
wishes to make is that in terms of the number of veto players there can be 
similarities between certain types of presidential and parliamentary regimes. In 
particular, there may be a small number of veto players, or just one, in both 
presidential systems and parliamentary systems where power is concentrated in 
the executive. Equally, there may be similarities between presidential systems, in 
which there is a higher number of veto players because of executive/legislative 
balance and bicameralism, and parliamentary systems where there is a multi-
party coalition.86 This aspect of Tsebelis’s analysis is entirely consistent with the 
general thrust of the work in the ‘second wave’. However, the way in which 
Tsebelis reaches his conclusion is fundamentally different. Moreover, it is only 
one element of a much wider set of studies to which Tsebelis applies his 
approach. 
 A similar point can be made with regard to another approach. This can be 
classed under the general heading of ‘new institutional economics’, or more 
specifically the ‘transaction cost’ approach and principal-agent theory. The 
origins of the new institutional economics date back to Ronald Coase’s work in 
the 1930s.87 However, it came into vogue in economics in the 1970s and 1980s. 
The key assumptions of the new institutional economics are that institutions 
matter and that their consequences can be analysed through economic theory.88 
One element of this body of work involves transaction costs. In economics, this 
approach has been used to explain why certain transactions take place within a 
market environment, while others occur within a more hierarchical context.89 The 
answer is that hierarchies are normally required when transaction costs, perhaps 
resulting from incomplete information, are high. This approach is often 
associated with principal-agent theory. Here, one actor (the principal) delegate 
power to another actor (the agent) with the expectation that the latter will act in a 
way that is consistent with the preferences of the former. Consistent with the 
general thrust of the transactions cost approach, the decision to delegate is 
usually motivated by a desire to reduce transaction costs. Overall, this body of 
work is extremely broad. It covers various disciplines, including economics, 
political science and law. Moreover, even within political science, the principal-
agent approach has been applied to a vast range of subjects, perhaps most 
notably the study of bureaucracy.90 
 In his most recent work, Kaare Strøm has applied principal-agent theory 
to the study of parliamentary and presidential democracy. He views 
representative democracy as a chain of delegation. In this schema, the ultimate 
principal is the voter, who delegates sovereign authority to a representative, 
acting as an agent. In turn, that representative, now acting as a principal, may 
delegate his/her authority to someone else, acting as his/her agent. And so on. 
For Strøm this chain of delegation is inherently different in parliamentary and 
presidential democracies.91 In parliamentary democracies, voters delegate 
authority to representatives in parliament. They delegate authority to a prime 
minister and cabinet, who then delegate that authority to ministers as heads of 
government departments. Ministers then delegate their authority to civil 
servants. By contrast, in presidential democracies voters delegate authority to 
both a president and representatives, usually in more than one legislative 
institution. The president then delegates authority to a secretary as the head of a 
government department. In turn, the secretary delegates authority to civil 
servants. At the same time, though, one or more of the houses of the legislature 
may also delegate authority to a departmental secretary by virtue of being part of 
the appointment process. Equally, the legislature may delegate authority to the 
administration, for example, by creating independent authorities. This situation 
is captured by Strøm as follows: “Representation begins with a multitude of 
principals (the citizens) and ends with a large number of agents (civil servants). 
In between, however, the parliamentary chain narrows down more than does the 
presidential one. Simply put, parliamentary delegation relationships take the 
form of a long and singular chain, whereas presidential ones look more like a 
grid”.92 
 This method of analysis is interesting for many reasons, not the least of 
which is that, in contrast to much of the recent work on the topic, it reasserts the 
distinction between presidential and parliamentary systems. For Strøm, there are 
inherent institutional differences between the two.93 As a result, even though 
Strøm does not aim to determine which system works best, and even though he 
acknowledges that to understand how systems work we need to read the fine 
print of their constitutions and organisational rules, he is willing to argue that 
the two systems have specific advantages and disadvantages.94 In particular, he 
argues that parliamentarism is better at coping with the standard principal-agent 
problem of adverse selection, or the situation where the principal cannot be sure 
which agent is best for the job. Parliamentarism fares well in this regard because 
of the role of political parties that help to screen potential candidates before they 
enter the selection process. This may increase the likelihood of skilled and honest 
candidates being selected. By contrast, presidentialism is better at coping with 
the other basic principal-agent problem of moral hazard, or the situation where 
the principal cannot be sure how the agent is working after s/he has been 
selected. To the extent that in presidential systems there are multiple and 
competing principles controlling particular agents, then the opportunities for ex 
post monitoring are increased. 
 The work by Tsebelis and Strøm is indicative of the ‘third wave’ of 
presidential and parliamentary studies. At first glance, there may seem little that 
links the work of the two authors. For example, Tsebelis stresses the institutional 
similarities between presidential and parliamentary systems, while Strøm 
stresses their differences. On closer inspection, though, they are linked by their 
attempt to apply general theories of political analysis to particular institutional 
debates, in this case the debate about presidentialism and parliamentarism. This 
method separates their work from the ‘first’ and ‘second’ wave of studies. 
Moreover, the ‘third wave’ will not necessarily be confined to the work of 
Tsebelis and Strøm. These writers have presented the fullest expression of it so 
far, but there is plenty of opportunity for other writers to build on their work. 
Moreover, there is also opportunity for other writers to adapt other general 
approaches and apply them to the specific issue of presidentialism and 
parliamentarism. In this regard, Thomas Hammond and Christopher Butler’s 
recent deductive model of policy choice and policy change in presidential and 
parliamentary systems is a good example of where the future of ‘third wave’ 
studies may lie.95 
 
Conclusion 
 
This article has identified ‘three waves’ of presidential/parliamentary studies 
since 1990, but waves that are not wholly sequential. Work associated with the 
‘second wave’ continues, even though a distinct ‘third wave’ is evident. 
Moreover, there is a degree of overlap between the work in the three apparently 
discrete ‘waves’ of studies. For example, Haggard and McCubbins’s ‘second 
wave’ study uses supposedly ‘third wave’ veto players analysis as part of its 
exploration of parliamentary and presidential systems.96 Notwithstanding these 
points, I would argue that it is still useful to separate these ‘three waves’ as there 
is some temporal sequence to the studies and, in any case, each set of studies 
represents a different way of approaching the same problem. In addition, this 
way of organising the debate also helps to identify how the terms of the debate, 
and the state-of-the-art thinking about presidentialism and parliamentarism, has 
changed over time. 
 So, what are we to think about the state of presidential/parliamentary 
studies nearly a decade and a half after Linz’s seminal article? Part of the answer 
to this question is that we know a lot more than we used to. For example, there is 
scarcely anyone who would now disagree with the assertion that institutions 
matter. More importantly, Linz’s work, and the work of everyone who followed 
him, has helped us to understand better how institutions matter. In short, we now 
know that if we want to determine the consequences of presidential and 
parliamentary systems, then we also need to know something about the wider 
institutional context in which they operate. More than that, we also know which 
aspects of the institutional context we need information about: in particular, the 
powers of the president and legislature, and the electoral system. This does not 
mean that ‘one-size-fits-all’. We cannot recommend one type of system in every 
case. However, we can say with at least some certainty that if highly divided 
countries adopt executive-centred presidential systems, then they are probably 
making a mistake. We can also say that other countries may not necessarily lose 
out from the adoption of a carefully crafted presidential system. To some, this 
may not be much of an advance, but at least it is better than nothing. 
 The other part of the answer to the above question is more controversial. 
What we think about the current state of presidential/parliamentary studies is at 
least partly a function of what we think about the current state of political science 
generally. I am sure that there are some people, maybe a majority, who believe 
the ‘third wave’ of presidential/parliamentary studies is either redundant 
and/or incomprehensible. For instance, does Tsebelis’s work tell us anything 
that the more established studies have not? Arguably it does not. If it does not, 
then why do we need to even try to understand concepts such as winsets, 
wincircles and yolks, never mind do the maths that underpins them? In short, if 
you do not like positive political science, then the ‘third wave’ of studies will 
leave you cold. By the same token, though, if you do like positive political 
science, then much, but not all, of the ‘first’ and ‘second’ waves will leave you 
equally cold. For example, from a positivist perspective it is virtually impossible 
to derive testable hypotheses from the ‘second wave’ and from the much-cited 
Weaver and Rockman volume. Indeed, Elinor Ostrom accused these authors of 
asking questions in a way that was “unanswerable”97 and of finding answers to 
them that were “more vacuous than one would expect”98 given the intellectual 
calibre of the editors and contributing authors. 
 For my part, studying the debate about presidentialism and 
parliamentarism for over a decade has led me to the conclusion that it is 
important to be as rigorous and systematic as possible in the analysis of 
institutional variables. To this end, I am more than ever inclined towards the 
‘third wave’ of studies than many may be. True, this work may not tell us 
anything startlingly new, but at least ‘third wave’ writers adopt a method which 
means that we can be more sure than before that what we thought to be the case 
actually is. In other words, to my mind the advantage lies in the method, rather 
than the outcome. This conclusion can only be properly justified in the context of 
a different article about the study of political life generally. Moreover, some of 
the ‘second’ wave studies are almost equally rigorous, including virtually 
anything written by Shugart, Carey, Mainwaring, Haggard and McCubbins. All 
the same, the controversial nature of this conclusion suggests that there is 
probably still some life in the presidential/parliamentary debate even after a 
decade and a half. 
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